[kitchencabinetforum] BRETT SCHAEFER AND VACLAV KLAUS WARN OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Brett Schaefer points out the Founders believed that nations should seek to work amicably toward common goals and in defense of mutual interests. As George Washington advised Americans in his Farewell Address, "Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all."

Schaefer notes the Founding Fathers also knew that nations had competing priorities, and that, as new concerns emerged, the pull of shared goals and interests could weaken or disappear. Alliances were therefore naturally impermanent. As Alexander Hamilton observed there is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties.

The issue which bothers Vaclav Klaus the most is the accelerating move towards global governance, which means towards the weakening of the traditional pillar of democracy – of the nation state. It is very fashionable to argue now that due to globalization, which means internationalization of human activities, we need global governance. Klaus does not agree. The fact that similar problems occur in many countries does not mean that they are global and that they should be confronted by using less of markets and more of governments. The unstoppable and basically positive internationalization of human activities doesn't ask for centralistic solutions. http://venitism.blogspot.com

Hamilton, like the other Founders, believed an alliance was like a contract: it was made between particular states for a definite purpose. The Founders were not opposed to alliances. On the contrary, they valued alliances when they were advantageous, as evidenced by the Treaty of Alliance they negotiated with France in 1778. But, again like a contract, the provisions of the alliance had to be explicit. Hamilton warned that a vague treaty with unrealistic objectives is not enforceable and encourages signatories to violate it.

In the early part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion.

The war between Britain and France in the 1790s, and the complications this created for America because of its Treaty of Alliance with France, led the Founders to be wary about alliances that pretend to be binding for all time. In 1798, Congress annulled the Treaty of Alliance with France. Washington later criticized the Treaty in his Farewell Address, cautioning that nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded. Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. Washington did not call for America to withdraw from the world, but he cautioned against permanent connections and alliances.

Klaus asserts the solution of the pressing problems of our era doesn't lie in creating new governmental and supranational agencies. It is also not about the technicalities of these solutions. It is about democracy and democracy needs demos, democracy needs citizens and citizenship – without them democracy cannot be constituted. We can't have democracy at the level of the European Union, with 27 different nation states. Similarly, there can't be democracy at the level of the world. It is possible to have an efficient intergovernmentalism but not a democratic world-wide supranationalism. Recent attempts to start organizing global governance on the basis of organizations like G20 are unacceptable.

Hamilton believed that successful cooperation occurs when there are mutual benefits, and when a failure to cooperate would hurt all parties. Unfortunately, most international organizations suffer from the problems that Hamilton ascribed to unrealistic compacts.

Like an alliance, international organizations are usually established by a treaty. But unlike an alliance, they are presumed to be permanent, and cannot be annulled by the United States. They are composed of states with conflicting interests and frequently have ill-defined purposes and vague responsibilities. The work of international organizations often depends principally on the "good faith" that Hamilton regarded as unreliable. The costs of violating that good faith are generally minimal.

Klaus points out a special case is Europe. In the 1950s, the leading idea behind European integration was to liberalize, to open-up, to remove barriers at the borders of individual European countries, to enable free movement of not only goods and services but of people and ideas around the European continent. It was a positive concept. The situation changed during the 1980s and the decisive breakthrough came with the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991. Integration had turned into unification, liberalization into centralization of decision making, into harmonization of rules and legislation, into the strengthening of European institutions at the expense of institutions in member states, into the growth of democratic deficit, into post-democracy.

Klaus laments it was shifted further in the same direction by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The EU has been gradually changing from community of cooperating nations to the union of non-sovereign entities. We see that the move towards an ever-closer Europe – without an authentic European identity and a European demos – leads to the accelerated formation of supranational bureaucratic structures. It tends to restrain freedom, democracy and democratic accountability, not to speak about economic efficiency, entrepreneurship and competitiveness.

Brett Schaefer points out the international organization most familiar to Americans is the United Nations, but it is far from the only one. The United States belongs to over 50 international organizations, ranging from largely technical institutions like the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, to regional diplomatic organizations like the Organization of American States, to financial institutions like the World Bank.

Schaefer notes that while most international organizations were created after 1945, there are older ones, such as the International Telecommunication Union established in 1865, which sets standards to facilitate electronic communications. The older organizations typically have a limited scope, which helps them resist politicization, and they create tangible benefits that give nations an incentive to participate in their work and abide by their agreements.

Contrast this with the United Nations. The United States was instrumental in the founding of the U.N., and the preamble of the U.N. Charter echoes the Declaration of Independence. Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman saw the establishment of the United Nations as a way to disseminate uniquely American ideals to other nations.

But as Hamilton could have predicted, the U.N.'s aspirations have often foundered on the shoals of conflicting national interests. Despite the political and financial support the U.N. has received from the U.S., and its influential position as a permanent, veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council, the United States has often been disappointed by the U.N.'s fractiousness and by the fact that many of its member states do not live up to the principles espoused in the U.N. Charter. Indeed, the founding purposes of the U.N. are all too often forgotten in a hurry to address, in Hamilton's words, "any immediate interest or passion."

As President Ronald Reagan observed in his 1985 address to the U.N. General Assembly: The vision of the U.N. Charter — to spare succeeding generations this scourge of war — remains real. It still stirs our soul and warms our hearts, but it also demands of us a realism that is rock hard, clear-eyed, steady, and sure — a realism that understands the nations of the United Nations are not united.

Schaefer muses that undoubtedly, the U.N. does some good. Certainly, it could address more problems if its member nations were truly united. But the mere act of establishing an international organization and asserting that its membership shares common aims and goals does not make this a reality.

Brett Schaefer points out conflicting interests and values among nations will always impede collective action to address international peace and security, advance human rights, or facilitate better standards of life. Worse, member states often misuse international organizations to undermine peace and freedom, and the organizations themselves increasingly seek to infringe on national sovereignty, which is an assault on the rights of the people in democratic nations around the world.

Schaefer notes that supporting international organizations is not without consequence. It is a burden, albeit sometimes a burden worth bearing. But refusing to recognize the limitations of international organizations and their potential to cause harm does a disservice to the American people, who often pay for the largest share of the activities of international organizations, both beneficial and detrimental.

If the United States is not to undermine its interests, it must abandon its default position of supporting and engaging with international organizations regardless of their performance. Instead, the U.S. must assess honestly whether each organization works, whether its mission is focused and attainable and not dependent on "good faith" that does not exist, and whether it advances U.S. interests.

International organizations are a tool to attain a goal, not an end in themselves. They are one way for the U.S. to defend its interests and to seek to address problems in concert with other nations. But they are not the only option, and their strengths and weaknesses should be clearly understood.

Schaefer asserts the United States should not participate in an international organization simply because it exists. If an international organization is effectively addressing a problem and unmistakably advances American interests, the U.S. should support it. But if the organization is irrelevant, badly flawed, or opposed to U.S. interests, the United States should not reward that organization with financial support or participation, which would lend it prestige and credibility it does not deserve.

While the American Founders did not live in an age of international organizations, they wanted the U.S. to govern itself, to practice diplomacy, and to seek to live in amity with other nations. As long as international organizations contribute to these ends, they are valuable. If they do not, they are destructive, and the American people should seek to modify or withdraw from them and, if necessary, found new organizations that will contribute more effectively to our safety and happiness.